What if living in a relatively trustworthy society was sufficient to blindly trust strangers? In this paper we interpret generalized trust as a learning process and analyse the trust game paradox in light of the replicator dynamics. Given that trust inevitably implies doubts about others, we assume incomplete information and study the dynamics of trust in buyer-supplier purchase transactions. Considering a world made of "good" and "bad" suppliers, we show that the trust game admits a unique evolutionarily stable strategy: buyers may trust strangers if it is not too risky to do so. Examining the situation where some players may play either as trustor or as trustee we show that this result is robust.
, between cities of different sizes (Yamagishi et al. 1998; Tsuji and Harihara 2002) and between social strata (Yosano and Hayashi 2005) . In an experiment on the minimum effort game, Engelmann and Normann (2010) observed that recent immigrants behave according to the standards of their home country, but that with time tend to behave according to the standards of the host country. This suggests that contrary to findings that trust is an anchored cultural inheritance (Uslaner 2004) , an individual may learn to trust or to distrust strangers when changing their environment. The literature has paid scant attention to the question of learning to trust, and idiosyncratic subjects are usually described as consistent in their propensity to trust over time (e.g., Katz and Rotter 1969; Uslaner 2002; Bjornskov 2006 ). An individual changing to a different social environment or a social policy modifying a social environment may however influence the propensity to trust strangers. Our main hypothesis in this paper is that individuals behave according to their general beliefs about the trustworthiness of their partners. We assume trust is not related to a set trait of individual personality (Uslaner 2002 ) but rather to a trusting culture grounded on social and political institutions (Putnam 1993 (Putnam , 2000 . This presupposes that trust is inextricably linked to generalized trustworthiness in society (Nooteboom 2010) . If nearly everyone is trustworthy then trusting a stranger is a profitable bet; if nearly everyone is untrustworthy then it is clearly not. 1 We consider a trust game paradox as defined by Kreps (1990) . The only subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is the situation where the trustor withholds trust. This is a social paradox since without trust, social exchange is more costly. Kreps (1990) and Kandori (1992) argue that repetition and therefore reputation, is the natural solution to lack of trust in this game. If Grim strategies are followed, a trusting relationship can be established as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The assumption of different payoff functions, say of the inequity aversion type described in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , may also be conducive to trust.
2 Considering an indirect evolutionary approach, Güth and Kliemt (1994) and Güth et al. (2000) show that trust is established as soon as a detection-type mechanism which reveals trustworthiness is implemented.
Complementary to this literature, we are interested in explaining generalized trust under the condition of pure anonymity. Bower et al. (1996) study what may happen when an incomplete information trust game is played sequentially by players who observe the outcomes of previous games played 1 Note that many contributions study determinants of generalized trust by focusing on the correlation between generalized trust and variables such as democracy (e.g., Bjornskov 2006), political participation (e.g., Montoro and Puchades 2010), professional associations (e.g., Sabatini 2009), economic growth (e.g., Knack and Keefer 1997) , income inequality (e.g., Uslaner 2002; Yamamura 2008) , education (e.g., Zak 2002), ethnicity (e.g., Holm and Danielson 2005) or religions (e.g., La Porta et al. 1997) . They offer detailed and precise estimates of possible determinants of trust and should not be envisioned as competing but complementing our approach.by others. As Kreps (1990) , they examine a repeated trust game but consider an endogeneous learning process according to trustors update their beliefs on the basis of previous moves of an entire population of agents. They show that when this form of anonymity is introduced in the iterated trust game, trust relationships are likely to break down. We are interested into revisiting this result by reconsidering the usual game theoretic assumption of constant and unchanging preferences. Following Lahno (2004) and consistently with experimental evidence conducted by Camerer and Weigelt (1988) , we question the assumption according to agents have the ability to conduct the complicated calculations necessary to determine the reputation of others and to tailor their behaviour to comply with the rules of equilibrium. Bicchieri et al. (2004) and Bravo and Tamborino (2008) offer a direct evolutionary analysis of trust. The former provide a simulation model showing that within a homogeneous population, trust exchange may emerge spontaneously; the latter study reputation mechanisms and show that generalized trust is present in systems where information regarding the past behaviour of agents can spread sufficiently. As Bicchieri et al. (2004) , we suggest that individuals have the ability to learn "good" strategies from observing what worked well in the past and we consider that they make their choice with information asymmetries, where beliefs are relevant. This translates into considering an evolutionary setting where players learn to trust strangers in case it proves to be a profitable bet. We examine the game using the replicator dynamics 3 model and complete the work of Bicchieri et al. by proposing a theoretical evolutionary model of generalized trust.
We focus on the behaviour of trustors and consider that trustworthiness is a type that implies a trustee's belief in the value of reciprocating trust (Cook and Cooper 2003; Cochard et al. 2004; Ahn and Esarey 2008) . "Good" and "bad" trustees are in a fixed proportion in the population and we analyse how generalized trust comes to pervade a community of trustors. 4 Because a class of agents may have a larger strategy set, acting as both trustees and as trustors, we then enlarge our perspective to the situation where there is also a third type of player deciding alternatively whether to trust or not, and whether to honour or betray the trust of others.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the main characteristics of the trust game and its outcomes. Section 3 analyses the evolutionary outcome of the game using the replicator dynamics. We consider first that the roles of the players are set and then turn to a setting where some players have mixed roles. Section 4 concludes. All proof is relegated to the Appendix.
We consider trust exchange between two players involved in a transaction, a buyer and a supplier. 5 Their trust relationship concerns for example the quality or the delivery of a product. Our approach applies however to other transactions and can be illustrative of employment relationship between an employer and an employee as studied by Kreps (1993) or of micro-credit relationship between a lender and a borrower as studied by Karlan (2005) .
We denote respectively 1 and 2 the buyer and the supplier. The buyer chooses to trust or not the supplier delivering the product and the latter has an incentive to cheat. For example, the supplier could try to sell a good of lower quality than the one expected, or he could not deliver the product on time. Assume there are two types of suppliers: good suppliers (denoted 2 G ) and bad suppliers (denoted 2 B ). The first are in proportion p, the second in proportion 1-p. When the game starts the buyer does not know what type of supplier she is transacting with, but both players know their own type. It follows that in a prior move, nature (denoted N) determines the supplier's type. Once supplier type is assigned, then the players play the game depicted in Fig. 1 . We assume that after observing the game's outcome, players change behaviour, imitating actions that yield higher benefits.
The game proceeds as follow. The buyer moves first and chooses between two strategies: 6 mistrust (M) or trust (T). If she mistrusts the supplier, the game ends. If the buyer trusts the supplier, it is the supplier's turn to move. The supplier's strategy space encompasses two possible actions: to honour the trust (H), or exploit it (E). Note that in the figure, numbers in brackets are probabilities of nature moves and the terms at the root of the tree represent as usual, the payoffs of the players.
To obtain the trust game we assume: Gautschi (1999) , the two types of supplier can be distinguished via small differences in their reward c 2 . If the supplier honours the trust placed by the buyer, fairness considerations increase his payoff c 2 by ε. More precisely, if the supplier is a good supplier, his additional payoff is ε ≥ b 2 − c 2 which may be interpreted as a taste for reciprocity. If he is bad, his additional payoff is defined by β ≤ b 2 − c 2 which may be interpreted as a taste for egoism. It results that if the supplier is a good supplier, he honours trust in the transaction; if he is a bad supplier, he betrays trust.
The outcome when the buyer mistrusts the supplier constitutes the reference situation. In this case, the gains are normalized to 0. This is the status quo point, i.e. the state that exists before trust emerges.
Before considering dynamics, we start focusing on the case where players are rational and choose whether it is a profitable bet or not to trust strangers. ) and then, player 1 chooses M and no trust relationship takes place. We deduce that without a dynamical learning process, it may be a good bet for rational players to trust each others when it is not too costly/risky. Bower et al. (1996) study a similar game considering a learning model. They examine trust in a repeated game where players observe the outcomes of previous game sessions. The outcomes of early plays of the game reveal information about the types of players 2 (called agents) and players 1 (called principal) updates its beliefs.
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They show that "trust and cooperation may permanently break down due to the revision of beliefs about the population of agents"(p. 166). In other words, if the learning process leads the principal to be pessimistic about the population of agents, these last honor less trust. We propose in the following to revisit this result within an evolutionary perspective by assuming that individuals have the ability to learn "good" strategies from observing what worked well in the past and by considering that they make their choice with information asymmetries, where beliefs are relevant.
The evolutionary dynamics

Trust game with fixed role
We start focusing on the case where buyers and suppliers are fixed in the role of trustor and trustee, they are randomly matched to play the game. Let p 2G (respectively p 2B ) be the proportion of players 2 G (respectively 2 B ) choosing H and 1 − p 2G (respectively 1 − p 2B ) the proportion of players 2 G (respectively 2 B ) choosing E. Also, let p 1 (respectively 1 − p 1 ) be the proportion of players 1 choosing T (respectively M). Following Taylor and Jonker (1978) and Zeeman (1980) , the distribution of strategies in the population over time can be described by the replicator dynamics:
where π i is the expected gain of player i and π m i is the average gain for the ipopulation. The replicator dynamics describes the variation in the proportion of players of each type i within the population in the next generation. It means that when the expected gain of player i increases (in relation to the average gain in the i-population) the growth rateṗ i /p i also increases and more players from the i-population will imitate i's action. 8 Although more successful strategies grow faster than less successful ones, the average gain of the population does not necessarily grow over time. For example, if a fitter player 1 substitutes another one then its opponent, player 2, may yield a lower income.
Two remarks immediately follow. First, if a pure strategy is absent in the initial population, it will never appear in the game. Second, the deterministic system described by Eq. 1 takes into account that certain strategies may disappear over time. The possibility of extinction accounts for the idea that certain populations are invaded by competing behaviours. However, strategies that disappear can reappear if the environment becomes favourable again (Gintis 2000) .
Let us first analyse the behaviour of player 1. We next apply the same reasoning to the other player. Choosing T, player 1 will: (i) with a probability pp 2G , interact with a player 2 G playing H, enabling player 1 to get c 1 ; (ii) with a probability p(1 − p 2G ) interact with a player 2 G playing E, enabling player 1 to get b 1 ; (iii) with a probability (1 − p)p 2B interact with a player 2 B playing H, enabling player 1 to get c 1 ; and (iv) with a probability (1 − p) (1 − p 2B ), interact with a player 2 B playing E, enabling player 1 to get b 1 . We deduce that the expected gain of player 1 is:
and the average gain of all players 1 is:
It follows that the replicator equation describing the rate of growth of p 1 in the population is given by:
By analogy, the growth rate of p 2G and of p 2B are:
In order to study evolutionary dynamics, we examine the evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) of the game. Recall that a strategy r
2B is said to be ESS if it is a best reply to itself and it is a better reply to any alternative best reply μ than μ is to itself (Maynard Smith and Price 1973) . Because the game is asymmetric, if r * constitutes an ESS, r * is a pure strategy and there is no better reply to r * (Selten 1980 (Selten , 1988 . This means in our game that ESS can only be found at the corners of the unit cube, that is the 8 potential ESS: (1,1,1), (1,1,0), (1,0,1), (0,1,1), (1,0,0), (0,1,0), (0,0,1) and (0,0,0).
As shown by Gardner and Morris (1991) , if r * is an ESS, 9 then r * is a dynamic equilibrium which is hyperbolically stable with respect to the dynamics described by Eq. 1. In other words, identifying the ESS translates into identifying dynamic equilibria that are hyperbolically stable.
Definition 1 Let r
* be a dynamic equilibrium of the system described by Eq. 1 and J the Jacobian of the replicator dynamics, r * is said to be hyperbolically stable if all the eigenvalues of J evaluated at r * have negative real parts.
Analysis of all cases let us deduce the following result: This unique ESS depicts the situation where all buyers trust suppliers, good suppliers honour this trust and bad ones abuse it. As soon as p > −b 1 / (c 1 − b 1 ) > 0, the risk to place trust is sufficiently low and the probability that a buyer match a good supplier is high enough for systematic trust. Although bad suppliers are encouraged over time systematically to abuse trusting players since this allows them to reap higher benefits, the buyers continue trusting given that the expected gain associated to strategy M is lower than the expected gain associated with strategy T.
Being prone to egoism, bad suppliers are encouraged over time systematically to abuse trusting players since this allows them to reap higher benefits. In any case the buyer will continue trusting given that the expected gain associated to strategy M is lower than the expected gain associated with strategy T. However, given that there are fewer bad suppliers than good suppliers, the evolutionary pressure cancels out when all bad suppliers have played E. And given the weakness of the proportion of bad suppliers in the entire population of suppliers, the buyers have no reason to change their behaviour (because the expected gain associated with M is lower than T). For good suppliers the reasoning is the reverse of that applied to bad suppliers.
Two comments follow. First, when the proportion of good suppliers is high enough, relations of trust spread as if they were new social norms. Trust is behaviourally internalized and players reproduce it naturally. This interpretation of trust is consistent with the one of "embeddedness" depicted by Granovetter (1985) . According to this last, the on-going networks of social relations between people discourage malfeasance and trust is viewed as embedded within social relationships. A key difference is however that embeddedness theory focuses on the enhancement of reputation in interpersonal relationships. Trust is portrayed as taking place locally first, within neighbourhood relationships, to extend next to more distant relationships. Individuals would start investing in their neighbourhood relationships in order to reduce the risk of holding trust, to next consolidate their network investing further away. Instead, in our approach, individual reputation is secondary. A buyer is not interested into a particular seller but to have information (in probability terms) about the set of sellers composing the environment, a sort of average reputation. If in average sellers are trustable, a buyer will trust anyone with an accepted probability to interact with an egoist.
Second, we show that the learning process may converge toward a unique steady state equivalent to the Bayesian equilibrium (a). Case (b) does not exist through imitation and we deduce that considering an evolutionary perspective, we obtain a result opposite to Bower et al. (1996) . By imitating others, trust and cooperation does not break down and in case proportion of good trustors is high enough, trusting relationships is a steady state. Evolutionary learning give therefore support to the argument according to trust relationships establish in case trust is a good bet.
The trust game allowing for mixed role
The assumption of fixed roles can be viewed as a limitation given that in the complexity of real life, some players may sometimes play both roles. We now introduce a third kind of player who can randomly take on either role. We call this player hybrid and denote him with the number 3. These players are typically the ones found buying and selling on Internet sites such as priceminister or eBay and conform to several situations involving trust transactions. Considering again the extensive form game represented in Fig. 1 , the hybrid player can be in first or second position. When he is in first position, he has the same strategy space as a buyer. Respectively if he is in second position, he has the same strategy space as a supplier and can be of either good or bad type. We call a good type hybrid player 3 G and a bad type one 3 B . We suppose hybrid players are behaviourally consistent and we consider that if they trust as buyers they will honour trust as suppliers, strategies T and H are played by hybrid players proportionally. This assumption is consistent with the experimental studies of Deutsch (1958) or of Dubois and Willinger (2007) according to trusting and trustworthy behaviours tend to be displayed by the same agents.
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Introducing this new category of players modifies slightly our game. Now, when it starts, nature makes two random moves. First it determines the role of the hybrid player and second, the type of supplier. We assume the hybrid player to be buyer or supplier with a probability 1/2. Possible random matchings then are: a buyer and a supplier, a hybrid player and a supplier, a buyer and a hybrid player.
In order to study the evolutionary dynamics of this game, we proceed as in the previous case. That is, we start determine the replication equation associated to the behaviour of player 1, the difference being that now she may match with a player 2 or with a player 3. We proceed by analysing expected payoffs of players 2 and 3 which let us, overall, describe the dynamics by a system of five differential equations. Solving this system translates into identifying the set of ESS in pure strategy. We have 2 5 = 32 potential ESS and studying the eigenvalues of the Jacobian we deduce that only two are ESS. b 1 ) ), the only stable state in the population is (1,1,0,1,1) . In other words, whether they are hybrids or not, all buyers trust and all hybrids and good suppliers honour this trust. In this stable state, as in Proposition 1, all buyers trust. However, the validity condition is now stricter: the proportions of good players must be higher. The principal difference between this setting and the previous one is that now, bad suppliers and notably hybrid ones honour the trust placed by the buyers. Indeed, when buying, a bad hybrid gets a high benefit by trusting because in average, he has a high probability to make a transaction with a supplier that will honour trust. As his behaviour when selling is correlated to his behaviour when buying, the hybrid supplier honours trust. This allows him to reap a high payoff since he matches only with trusting buyers. Given the expected payoff of a hybrid player is the average of what he obtains as a buyer and as a supplier, the overall gain is high. Note that when acting as a supplier, if a bad hybrid player systematically betrays buyers, he also yields high benefits. However, given consistence in behaviour, he never trusts when buying either. It follows that as a buyer he receives a nil benefit which balances the benefit he obtains as a supplier. In the long run, this player ends up in a worse situation than if he always placed and honoured trust. This effect does not exist for bad suppliers that always play second in the game. They never honour trust and this is all the more profitable that they match only with trusting buyers.
If the proportion of good suppliers and of good hybrids within their respective populations is lower than (b 2 − c 2 − β − b 1 ) (c 1 − b 1 ) but higher or equal to −b 1 /(c 1 − b 1 ), the game yields another stable state with similar characteristics but in which bad hybrids never trust when buying and always betray trust when supplying. Indeed for a buyer, given that there are fewer good suppliers, trusting them is less profitable. When buying, bad hybrids yield higher benefit on average from mistrusting. Because their behaviour is consistent, they always betray buyers when acting as suppliers. This allows them to increase their benefits and compensate for lack of benefit when playing as buyers. This stable state admits a similarity to Proposition 1: all bad players, hybrids or not, always exploit trust. Again, the validity condition is more restrictive given that now the proportion of good players will be between two bounds: high but not too high.
Finally note that under the same conditions as in Proposition 1 and for any stable state, trust relationships regularly take place. Proposition 1 is robust to a setting where some agents have a larger strategy space.
Conclusion
In the absence of a contract and/or an institution guaranteeing some form of social control, agents with limited knowledge may trust and learn to trust strangers because this is simply a good bet. Focusing on trust in transactions, we show that buyers may trust indiscriminately when the proportion of good suppliers is above a given threshold. Bad suppliers continue betraying trusting buyers but they are few enough not to undermine generalized trust. A trustful world does not necessarily imply a fully trustworthy one. This result contradicts the conclusion of Bower et al. (1996) according to letting players revise their belief over time leads to the collapse of trust relationships. By assuming that individuals have the ability to learn "good" strategies from observing what worked well in the past and by considering that they make their choice with information asymmetries, we show that the Bayesian equilibrium outcome according to players trust each others if it is not too risky, is robust over time. Introducing a third kind of individual, we analysed whether the introduction of agents playing mixed roles threatens trust. The answer is no and our results remain fundamentally similar.
These results are important in a threshold-based perspective. While most of the literature currently focuses on the determinants to trust by considering correlations between trust and variables such as education, religions, income inequality or democracy, we simply argue that guaranteeing a trusting threshold may be sufficient to establish generalized trust in a society. As Nooteboom (2010) shows, trust and institutions are both substitutes and complements. Contracts support reliance but can be destructive to trust and one can argue that contracts may be used in order to attain a certain threshold ensuring trustworthiness. Complementing the work of Zucker (1986) and Nooteboom (2002) , a threshold-based analysis would allow for a better understanding of the design of contracts and notably the best timing for lasting trust to be established.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The Jacobian of the replicator dynamics at any point r = (p 1 , p 2G , p 2B ) can be expressed as follows:
and therefore:
According to definition (1), in order to characterize the ESS we should study the eigenvalues of the matrix J in each of the 8 points that are candidates.
Let r* = (1,1,1). The Jacobian is:
The eigenvalues are: -c 1 , -(c 2 + ε -b 2 ), -(c 2 + β -b 2 ). They are all negative (which shows that (1,1,1) is hyperbolically stable) if:
The condition on the gains of 2 B (i.e. (c 2 + β -b 2 ) > 0) contradicts one of the assumption of the trust game and we deduce that (1,1,1) is not an ESS. In the same manner, we show that (1,0,1) and (1,0,0) are also not ESS.
We focus now on (1,1,0), (0,1,1), (0,1,0), (0,0,1) and (0,0,0). For (1,1,0), we have:
and this point is an ESS because conditions on the gains of the two types of player 2 do not contradict the assumptions of the model. We have: c 2 + ε − b 2 > 0 and c 2 + β − b 2 < 0 and these conditions are verified for:
Regarding ( For each of those cases, 0 is an eigenvalue and they are not ESS which concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2
We proceed as in proposition 1, the difference being that now there is a third type of player that may both play as buyer or seller. We denote by p 3G (respectively p 3B ) the proportion of players 3 G (respectively 3 B ) choosing T when buying and choosing H when selling. The complement 1 − p 3G (respectively 1 − p 3B ) is the proportion of players 3 G (respectively 3 B ) choosing M when buying and E when selling.
We start determine the replication equation associated to the behaviour of player 1. If she matches a player 2, her expected payoff is pp 2G 
Since player 1 matches a player 2 with probability 1/2 and a player 3 with a probability 1/2, her expected payoff is:
The average gain of all 1-players is π m 1 = p 1 π 1 + (1 − p 1 )0 and the growth rate of
Consider now player 2 G . If he matches with a player 1, his expected payoff is p 1 (c 1 + ε). If he matches with a player 3, his expected payoff is pp 3G (c 2 + ε) + (1 − p)p 3B (c 2 + ε). Again, given player 2 G matches with a player 1 with a probability 1/2 and with a player 3 with a probability 1/2, his expected gain is:
The average gain of all 2 G -players is:
and the growth rate of p 2G is:
Similarly, we deduce that:
Finally, consider a hybrid player 3 G . If acting as a buyer, his expected payoff
and if acting as a supplier, his expected payoff is p 1 (c 2 + ε). Total expected gain is then:
and we deduce:
The growth rate of p 3G is:
Similarly, we obtain:
The Jacobian of the coefficient matrix of the above dynamics is the following: 
By assumption, Eqs. 3 and 4 are always true and Eqs. 2, 5 and 6 lead to the following inequality:
Given the assumption of the model, we deduce that (1,1,0,1,1) is an ESS when:
For point r* = (1,1,0,1,0), the Jacobian is: 
Inequalities (8) and (9) are always true and we deduce from Eqs. 7, 10 and 11 that:
Given −b 1 > b 2 − c 2 − ε − b 1 , we deduce:
which is the condition for (1,1,0,1,0) to be an ESS. End of the proof.
